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age employee. The question remains, was there a
two employees did not perceive the distinction and
of the cards as tantamount to a vote for the union?
as the one in the instant case, such an occurrence
"appre.iable effect" on the outcome of the election.

[Vol. 6

possibility that one or
considered the signing
In an election as close
would indeed have an

Derek Bok, a noted authority in labor law, states that there are three
basic questions an employee must ask in deciding whether or not to support
a union:
Are the conditions within the plant unsatisfactory? To what extent
can the union improve on these conditions? Will representation by
the union bring countervailing disadvantages as a result of dues payments, strikes, or bitterness within the plant? 58
The Savair decision deals with the last of these questions and concludes that
the waiver of initiation fees precludes employees from arriving at a rational
decision free from extraneous and unwarranted interference. The effect of
the decision is to provide employees with the opportunity to accurately assess
the disadvantages of joining the union unhampered by the extraneous consideration of whether to join the union before or after the election so as
to avoid the disadvantage of paying an initiation fee. In invalidating this
long accepted union practice, the Supreme Court has set a specific guideline
by which unions are to conduct 'their activities during representative elections.5 9 The decision makes it clear that the portion of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act which gives employees the right to refrain from
union activities should be enforced to the same extent as is that part of
section 7 which gives employees the right to organize bargaining units. By
granting equal importance to both aspects, the right to organize and the
right to refrain from organizing, the Court has moved further toward the
goal of insuring greater impartiality in union elections.
William R. Garmer

CRIMINAL LAW-Search and Seizure-Airport
Security Measures Allow Warrantless
Search of Checked Luggage
United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973).
Donald A. Cyzewski and James P. Herbert were preparing to board an
58. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 49 (1964).
59. The decision does not preclude a labor union from abolishing initiation fees
across the board; it merely requires that if the union has initiation fees then it cannot
waive them for a particular election. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., - U.S.
,
, 94
S. Ct. 495, 500-01, 38 L. Ed. 2d 495, 504 (1973).
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Eastern Airlines flight at Tampa International Airport when they were designated by the ticket agent as "selectees" under the Federal Aviation Administration's Behavior Pattern Profile for distinguishing potential aircraft
hijackers. When asked for identification by United States Marshals, they
produced only an airline ticket bearing the names J. Scalzi and J. Daly and
explained that their identification papers were in luggage which had been
checked for loading aboard their flight. The deputies instructed the airline to retrieve the luggage and took Herbert and Cyzewski to the marshal's
office at the airport. When their luggage arrived at the office, both defendants produced identification bearing their real names. They refused to permit inspection of the luggage, but agreed to magnetometer checks. The
magnetometer detected no metal on Herbert's person but metal was detected
when he passed through the device with his bag. Herbert stated that the
only metal objects in his bag were buckles on a pair of shoes, and offered
to be subjected to the magnetometer test again after the shoes were
removed. Without receiving a reply from the marshals, he unzipped the
bag and placed his hand inside it. At this point the bag was taken from
him and found to contain five pounds of marijuana. The district court, in
a pretrial hearing, suppressed as evidence the five pounds of marijuana and
the government appealed.' Held-Reversed. Airport security measures
are reasonable insofar as they permit government agents to determine
whether a suspect presents an immediate danger to air commerce. The
search may continue until the law enforcement official is satisfied that no
harm will come from allowing the passenger to board the plane. This includes the retrieval of checked baggage from the airplane and the warrantless search of it, if this is necessary to clearly establish the suspect's inno2
cence to the officers.
Airport searches have rapidly developed into a major exception to the
requirement of a search warrant based upon probable cause for a government search of private property. 3 In an effort to thwart hijackings, the government and the airlines have developed a method of screening all persons
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970), allows an appeal by the United States to a court
of appeals from a district court order suppressing evidence in a criminal proceeding
where jeopardy has not attached.

2. United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 513-14 (5th Cir. 1973).
3. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Some recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include (1) searches incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969); (2) "hot pursuit" of a suspected criminal, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967); (3) danger of destruction of known evidence, Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966); (4) searches to which the subject has given his consent, Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946); (5) the "automobile exception," Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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who travel aboard commercial airlines in the United States. 4 Basically, the
system consists of a "hijacker personality profile" containing characteristics
common to past hijackers,5 a magnetometer search, 6 and, if warranted by
these screenings, a request for identification and a frisk by a law officer.
Current Federal Aviation Administration regulations require that all passengers be subjected to a magnetometer search and that all carry-on luggage
be searched prior to boarding. 7
In the first case to uphold the constitutionality of this system, United
States v. Lopez, 8 the federal district court relied on the protective "stop and
frisk" procedure held to be constitutional in Terry v. Ohio.9 The Terry
decision held that an officer with reasonable grounds for believing that a
crime has been committed and that the suspect may be armed and dangerous, may conduct a narrowly limited search of the individual even though
there is no probable cause for an arrest.' 0 There are two requirements for
this type of warrantless search: first, there must be "specific and articulable
facts" which justify a belief that the suspect may be armed," and secondly,
the search must be limited in scope to what is necessary to accomplish its
justification.' 2 In Lopez the defendant was designated as a selectee on the
basis of the psychological profile and he was frisked when he was unable
to produce proper identification. The heroin discovered in the frisk was
suppressed as evidence because the airline had destroyed the objectivity of
the profile by eliminating one approved criterion and adding two unauthor4. The methods of anti-hijack screening have differed from time to time and
among different airlines. For a detailed discussion of the application of these procedures, see United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Note,
Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1039, 104041 (1971); Note, The Antiskyjack System: A Matter of Search--or Seizure, 48 Notre
DAME LAW. 1261, 1262-66 (1973).
5. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The
particular characteristics contained in the profile are necessarily secret. A consideration of the characteristics conducted in camera in Lopez found the profile to be a
"highly effective procedure for isolating potential hijackers." Id. at 1086. For a commentary on the profile by the psychologist who is primarily responsible for developing
it, see Dailey, Development of a Behaviorial Profile for Air Pirates, 18 VILL. L. REV.
1004 (1973).
6. The magnetometer is a device for detecting the presence of metal. It can be
calibrated to flash a warning light when a person carrying the amount of metal in a
small pistol passes through its magnetic field. United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797,
801 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), ajf'd, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
7. Emergency order of F.A.A., Dept. of Transp. Press Release No. 103-72 (Dec.
5, 1972), reprinted in part in United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 902 n.25 (9th Cir.
1973). See 14 C.F.R. §§ 107, 121.538 (1973). The order for mandatory search procedures came at the direction of the President in response to two particularly violent
and dangerous hijackings. 37 Fed. Reg. 25934-935 (1972).
8. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
9. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. Id. at 30.
11. Id. at 21.
12. Id. at 19-20, 25-26.
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ized characteristics,' 8 but the system itself was upheld as a reasonable and
necessary means of preventing hijackings.
The Terry reasoning has been the most significant basis for upholding
airport searches involving the anti-hijacking system. 14 In United States v.
Epperson,15 it was held that the use of a magnetometer constituted a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, but that "the danger is so
well known, the governmental interest so overwhelming, and the invasion
of privacy so minimal, that the warrant requirement is excused by exigent
national circumstances.' 16 When Epperson did not satisfactorily explain a
high magnetometer reading, a frisk which revealed a loaded pistol was "entirely justifiable and reasonable under Terry."IT Another aspect of the
Terry reasoning was recognized in United States v. Kroll,i8 where a search
of carry-on luggage was rendered invalid because it "exceeded the scope
of the search permissible under the circumstances."' 19 At the airline boarding gate Kroll was ordered to open the file section of his attache case, where
an envelope containing a small quantity of amphetamine was discovered.
The court found that given the state of the art of miniaturization existing
20
when the incident occurred, a search of the envelope was unreasonable.
This is consistent with the Terry principle that the scope of a warrantless
search must be reasonably related to the circumstances which justify it.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has, within the last year, developed its own line of airport-search cases. These decisions have both lowered the threshold of suspicious conduct required to inititate a Terry search
and increased its permissible scope. In United States v. Moreno2l a search
13. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1101-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). One
of the added characteristics contained an ethnic element which the court felt raised
equal protection problems, and the second added element required the individual judgment of the airline employee. Thus, the initial reason for conducting the search lacked
the "essential neutrality and objectivity of the approved profile." Id. at 1101.
14. United States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666, 668-69 (7th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3196 (1973); United
States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 672-74 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1973);
United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947
(1972); United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701, 703 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 995 (1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1971);
cf. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 729-30 (2d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1292 (C.D. Cal. 1972). Contra, United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1973). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held in several cases that searches of luggage conducted by airline employees
for the airline's own purposes are private searches, and thus beyond the reach of the
fourth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37, 39-40 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3195 (1973).
15. 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
16. Id. at 771.
17. Id. at 772.
18. 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973).
19. Id. at 886.
20. Id. at 887 & n.4.
21. 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W.3196 (1973).
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which revealed heroin was upheld even though the defendant had not been
designated as a selectee according to the behavioral profile, had not been
subjected to a magnetometer search, and had not presented himself for
boarding at an airline gate. 22 The court ignored the neutrality of the profile designation which was emphasized in United States v. Lopez23 and the
less intrusive magnetometer search for weapons, and stated that "the airport,
like the border crossing, is a critical zone in which special fourth amendment
considerations apply."'24 Moreno's nervousness (he changed waiting lines
several times at one ticket counter and finally changed airlines, and he
seemed especially apprehensive about a bulge in his coat), and the lies he
told concerning his destination in a taxicab trip and the date of his arrival
in San Antonio were deemed sufficient to justify a search when viewed in
25
the context of the aircrafthijacking menace.
The most important aspect of the Moreno decision is the extent of the
search which is now apparently authorized to effect airport security.2 6 The
court recognized that "modem technology has made it possible to miniaturize to such a degree that enough plastic explosives to blow up an airplane
can be concealed in a toothpaste tube. ' 27 This capability on the part of
hijackers, coupled with the court's statement that the primary purpose of
the search is not to protect the officers conducting it but to protect airline
passengers, 28 could be used to justify a search considerably more extensive
than a Terry pat-down search.
Several months after the Moreno decision, the court, in United States v.
22. The importance of these distinctions is made clear in United States v. Skipwith,
482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973), where "mere suspicion" is held sufficient to uphold
a boarding-gate search.
23. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
24. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W.
3196 (1973).
25. Id. at 50-51.

26. The actual search of Moreno was only slightly more than a pat-down search.
His coat was removed for a search of its pockets. Id. at 50-51.
27. Id. at 49. The court in United States v. Kroll, 351 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo.

1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973), where a search valid at its inception was
held illegal because of its scope, held that a general search was authorized to prevent

a passenger from carrying a weapon aboard an airplane, and that a general search
would allow inspection of only "that which may reasonably be deemed to conceal a
weapon or explosives." Id. at 153. Thus, a search of an envelope found in an attache
case was held to be unreasonable. This decision, however, was expressly limited to the
state of technology that existed at the time of the search. The court felt "that miniaturization of explosives . . . [might] invalidate the principles expressed in its opinion."
United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 887 n.4 (8th Cir. 1973), quoting an amendment
to the district court's decision.
28. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W.
3196 (1973). This is consistent with the language in Terry that an officer may conduct a limited search "for the protection of himself and others in the area .... "
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (emphasis added). Contra, United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1973).
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Skipwith,2 9 gave definition to the comparison of airport searches to border
searches made in Moreno by holding:
[W]hile Moreno established that searches of certain persons in the general airport area are to be tested under a case-by-case application of
the reasonableness standard, .

.

. those who actually present them-

selves for boarding on an air carrier, like those seeking entrance into
the country, are subject to a search based on mere or unsupported
suspicion.3 0
The panel which decided Skipwith weighed three factors in arriving at this
conclusion: public necessity, efficacy of the search, and degree of intrusion. With a reference to the Moreno decision and the dangers of air piracy discussed there, a search conducted to discover the nature of a bulge
in Skipwith's pocket was upheld. The court also rejected Skipwith's contention that a limited form of the exclusionary rule should apply to airport
searches where drugs are discovered, since the search was not intended to
discover drugs and could not have been conducted for that purpose.3 1
While the courts have been fairly consistent in applying the Terry reasoning to air security searches, at least one court has taken a different approach. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has rejected the stop-,
and-frisk rationale as inapposite to airport searches8 2 and instead, has
adopted the standards for "administrative" searches as appropriate for
the airport security system.33 The court found the purpose in conducting
air passenger searches to be in furtherance of a general regulatory scheme
"to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and
thereby to prevent hijackings."'3 4 An important element in this approach
is that a person must be given an opportunity to avoid the search by electing not to board the aircraft. This is necessary to limit the search to what
is required to satisfy the administrative need which justifies it.35
The Cyzewski decision is expressly recognized by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit as going a step beyond any previously sanctioned airport security search. Defendants' checked luggage was retrieved from the
29. 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
30. Id. at 1276. See Note, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1039, 1050-52 (1971), for a discussion of the applicability of customs searches to the airport security system.
31. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1277-79 (5th Cir. 1973). Aldrich,
J., in his dissenting opinion advocates the suppression of "proceeds towards which the
search was not, and could not have been independently, directed." Id. at 1280.
32. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1973).
33. Id. at 908.
34. Id. at 908.
35. Id. at 910-12; accord, United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1288-91
(C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
see United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 728-29 (2d Cir. 1973). Contra,
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F. 2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir. 1973). Judge Aldrich terms
the right-to-leave argument a "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" proposition. Id. at 1281
(dissenting opinion).
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airplane and searched-bags to which they could not have had access during
the flight even if they had contained weapons. The justification for this
encroachment upon traditional ,fourth amendment protections is the "ubiquitous hijacking menace."8' 6 The court was forced to stray from the original
Terry reasoning which allowed a protective warrantless search based on specific facts, 7 and instead to rely on the "prophylactic purpose of the security
system:

. . . to thwart potential hijackings by deterrence." 8

There can

be no doubt that deterring hijacking attempts by giving notice to airline passengers that they are subject to a search is an important aspect of the security system. Deterrence, however, cannot be used as the justification for
a search when there is no reasonable relation between the search and preventing a hijacking.
To accomplish the protective purpose of an airport search, the court could
have required that Cyzewski and Herbert be subjected to a magnetometer
test and frisk before being allowed to board. Since this procedure would
have obviated any armed hijacking attempt by the "suspects," it should have
been sufficient, under the Terry rationale, to allow them to continue on their
way. The procedure followed in the search of defendants' checked luggage
appears to go beyond even the court's own expansive interpretation of the
reasonableness of an airport search:
Airport security measures are reasonable . . . insofar as they permit

government agents to determine whether a suspect presents an immediate danger to air commerce. The search may continue until the law
enforcement official satisfies himself that no harm would come from
the passenger's boarding. . . . Only when it becomes unreasonable
for the suspect's innocence to be further questioned does the security
search itself become unreasonable. s8
Judge Thomberry, dissenting in Cyzewski, states: "Unless the nexus between the checked luggage and the danger of air piracy is established, the
'protective search' rationale cannot be properly used to uphold a checked
4
luggage search.' 0
41
In several other recent cases involving the search of baggage at airports,
convictions for the possession of narcotics were overturned despite the fact
that the officers had probable cause to conduct a search. The court rejected
these cases as authority for the Cyzewski decision because they are unre36. United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1973).
37. In the language of the Supreme Court "[tihe scope of the search must be
'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
38. United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. Id. at 513-14.
40. Id. at 518 (dissenting opinion).
41. United States v. Lonabaugh, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Soriano, 482 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Garay, 477 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir.
1973).
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lated to antihijacking security measures, but they bear a strong similarity
to the situation faced by the deputies after attention was focused upon
Herbert's and Cyzewski's luggage. These decisions hold that officers were
justified in seizing the suitcases, but that a warrant was constitutionally required before they could be searched. It should be emphasized here that
the deputies in Cyzewski were operating with considerably less than probable cause, 42 but even assuming that the suspicion created by the defendants could justify a search, a warrant should have been required before it
was carried out.43 Judge Thornberry cautions that increased reliance upon
the dangers of hijacking has caused an inversion of fourth amendment values. The need for "security" has allowed search, rather than privacy, to
44
become the norm.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has moved along a continuum
in a series of decisions, using each case upholding a warrantless airport
search as a steppingstone to further extend the range of permissible intrusion. The result, culminating in the instant case, is that the airport has
become an area where there are virtually no fourth amendment restrictions
on searches conducted in the name of hijack prevention. "Exigent circumstances" have allowed officers to conduct warrantless searches under certain carefully defined circumstances, but a warrant has been consistently required where there were no circumstances which made obtaining a warrant
unreasonable. Under the "airport exception," the standard for initiating a
search has been diluted to mere suspicion. In addition, the determination
of the permissible scope of the search now rests with the officer conducting
it, 45 rather than being "strictly tied to and justified by" the reason for its
inception."
In a decision subsequent to Cyzewski, the court indicates that the precedent of approving a checked luggage search will not be followed blindly.4
In that case, Michael Palazzo and his traveling companion had attracted
the attention of a deputy marshal by their nervous appearance, by an exchange of money in the waiting room, and other suspicious conduct. Marshal Granados' suspicions were further aroused when a search of Palazzo
revealed two baggage claim stubs, after he claimed he had no luggage. Since
no weapons were discovered in thorough personal searches of the men, they
42. The court appears to have relied in part on the defendant's -refusal to permit
an inspection of the bags as justification for the search. United States v. Cyzewski,
484 F.2d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 1973).
43. Id. at 518 (dissenting opinion). See United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942,
947 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 517-18 (5th Cir. 1973) (dissenting
opinion).
45. "Only when it becomes unreasonable for the suspect's innocence to be further
questioned does the security search itself become unreasonable." Id. at 514.
46. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
47. United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974).
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